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Numerous studies find a positive relationship between income inequality and 
incarceration rates within countries. Other scholars note inequality, as an explanatory 
variable for differences in incarceration rates, lacks statistical significance. I confirm the 
positive relationship between increased inequality and increased incarceration rates in 
initial analyses, but find when tested with additional explanatory variables, income 
inequality loses its significance as a predictor of incarceration rates. In this study, I 
examine this relationship to provide additional context for the circumstances under 
which inequality influences incarceration rates, and when other factors attenuate the 
effect of inequality. Not only do I control for crime rates, using homicide rates, but 
include a control for drug offense rates not noted in earlier studies. Given the paucity of 
research regarding world-systems theory and criminological outcomes, I examine the 
role of position in the world-system on incarceration rates and other cogent variables. 
Results indicate no direct relationship between world systems position (WSP) and 
incarceration rates but indicate strong relationships between WSP and homicide rates 
and drug offense rates. This cross-national study examines correlates of rates of 
incarceration for 77 countries from 1994 through 2008. I provide a description of trends 
in incarceration rates, inequality, wealth, democracy, urbanization, homicide rates, drug 
offense rates, and other societal measures over the past 15 years. Global trends are 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Although many scholars find a positive relationship between income inequality and 
incarceration rates, others, often using inequality as a control variable, find a lack of 
significance in their respective findings. Is inequality an effective predictor of 
incarceration rates? Using panel data for incarceration rates for 77 countries from 1994 
through 2008, I evaluate the relationship between income inequality and incarceration 
rates within countries, while controlling for country wealth and other factors to provide 
additional context for the influence of inequality. I also provide a graphic description of 
trends for many of the variables used in this study. Additionally, I examine the 
relationship of world-systems position (WSP) and incarceration, inequality, wealth, and 
other explanatory variables between countries.  
 Income inequality is a measure used in numerous studies to examine negative 
social outcomes based on the uneven distribution of wealth and income within societies. 
Studies find increased inequality associated with lower rates of educational attainment 
for women (Buchman 1996), lack of maternal care (Shandra, Shandra, and London 
2010), reduced food security (Jenkins and Scanlan 2001), and greater human rights 
violations (Abouharb and Cringranelli 2006), among others. It is often used as a proxy 
for power and control within countries, or as noted in this alternative version of the 
Golden Rule, he who has the gold makes the rules. In this case, those with the greatest 
power define behaviors deemed deviant, define which deviant behaviors are deemed 
criminal, and the define the appropriate punishments for those criminal acts within 




 Scholars note the impact of world-systems position on various social outcomes. 
Is position in the world system related to incarceration rates, and if so, how? I evaluate 
the impact of WSP on incarceration rates and note no significant relationship. However, 
when I evaluate the effect of WSP on homicide rates and drug offense rates, I find 
significant differences. Specifically, core countries have the lowest homicide rates and 
the highest drug offense rates than do semiperiphery and periphery countries.  
Durkheim (1966) notes that crime and deviance are present in all societies at all 
time; they function to affirm cultural values and norms, they establish boundaries of 
acceptable behavior and promote social unity. Deviant behavior is defined differently in 
different times, different cultures, and different levels of society. Behaviors deemed 
deviant within families may not be considered deviant within the larger community, and 
what is deemed deviant within a particular culture may not be considered deviant in 
other cultures. Crime offends the collective sentiment. As stated by Durkheim (1966): 
Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. 
Crimes, properly so called, will there be unknown, but faults which 
appear venial to the layman will create there the same scandal that the 
ordinary offense does in ordinary consciousness. If, then, this society has 
the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and 
will treat them as such. For the same reason, the perfect and upright man 
judges his smaller failings with a severity that the majority reserve for 
acts more truly in the nature of an offense. Formerly, acts of violence 
against persons were more frequent than they are today, because respect 




have become more rare; and also, many acts violating this sentiment 
have been introduced into the penal law which were not included there in 
primitive times (Pp. 68-69). 
As crime offends the collective sentiment, punishment confirms for societies the 
boundaries of acceptable behavior.   
 Different cultures define deviant and criminal behavior using various standards. 
They also have diverse standards for determining the type and degree of punishment 
imposed for criminal behavior. Due to historical, cultural, and political differences, 
countries vary in their levels of incarceration. This study examines some of the societal 
differences over the past two decades and how they have changed over that time; how 
position in the world system impacts incarceration, measures of wealth, democracy, and 
other variables; and how inequality impacts incarceration rates.  
Traditional societies tend to transition to modern societies through a series of 
steps or stages. Traditional societies have agricultural-based economies while modern 
societies’ economies are industrial-based. As societies modernize, they move from 
smaller, close-knit communities to larger, diverse communities with complex divisions 
of labor. Informal social controls, effective in traditional societies, are replaced by 
formal controls. Community sanctions move from personal to institutional.  
 Some posit that countries travel through similar trajectories in the 
modernization process. According to Rostow (1990), there are five stages common to 
economic growth, beginning with the traditional society and ending with societies of 




countries move toward modernization, not in the reverse. Modernization is a lengthy 
process by which societies tend to resemble their Western models (So 1990). 
Another perspective on modernization is that societies undergo change, and that 
change results in differences in levels of cohesion. Smaller, close-knit societies are held 
together by a collective conscience or mechanical solidarity. As societies modernize, 
they differentiate and become more complex through specialization and the division of 
labor (Durkheim [1933]1960). With increased specialization, the bonds of social 
cohesion weaken, and societies develop an interdependence of societal members held 
together by organic solidarity. Unlike Rostow’s proposition that change occurs 
incrementally over an extended period, Durkheim acknowledges that change may be 
more abrupt. Durkheim (1979) posits that when societies undergo rapid change, there is 
a loss of shared norms, or anomie. As social control diminishes, crime tends to increase.  
As societies modernize and move from mechanical to organic solidarity, 
punishment moves from repressive to restitutive (Durkheim [1933]1960:398). 
According to Durkheim, as societies progress there are both qualitative and quantitative 
changes in punishment. Noting the law of quantitative change, Durkheim ([1900]1973) 
states “[t]he intensity of punishment is the greater the more closely societies 
approximate to a less developed type . . .” (p. 285). In addition, less severe forms of 
punishment, like incarceration, would become the “normal means of social control” 
(Durkheim [1900]1973:294). He also noted the effect of government as an intervening 
agent in social change, maintaining levels of punishment when we would otherwise 
expect to see them decline (Durkheim [1900]1973:289). Punishment transitions from 




[1957]1963). A commensurate change is a transition from the punishment of the body 
to the punishment of the mind (Foucault [1977]1995). 
 Testing Durkheim’s qualitative and quantitative laws, Killias (1986) compresses 
the two hypotheses into one: that modernization will result in less punishment. On the 
other hand, Spitzer (1975a) takes exception to the perspective that modernization results 
in less severe punishment. He notes that “greater punitiveness is associated with higher 
levels of structural differentiation” (Spitzer 1975a:631).  
 Examining contemporary ideas regarding modernization and its influence on 
crime, Shahidullah (2014) notes both internal and external influences on societies as 
they transform. Within countries, “modernizing elites” (Shahidullah 2014:58) provide 
leadership during the transitional process. Externally, modernizing countries often 
employ institutional isomorphism as they seek to emulate more modern countries, 
which increases legitimacy, resources, stability, and survival prospects (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977:340). Modernization should result in criminal justice organizations that 
possess “higher level(s) of legitimacy, adaptability, competence, and performance” 
(Shahidullah 2014:59). Additionally, modernization may lead to more democratic forms 
of government with increasingly transparent criminal justice institutions and reductions 
in crime (Prillaman 2003).  
 The impact of democratization is not necessarily clear-cut, as noted by Jordan 
and Arnold (1995). One type of democracy is participatory pluralistic, which protects 
the rights of minorities with a “capsule of civil and political rights” (Jordan and Arnold 
1995:171). Alternatively, democracies may be characterized as populist, or those that 




against minorities” (Jordan and Arnold 1995:171). The greater impact populist policies 
have on criminal justice policies, the greater the degree of enforcement and punishment. 
Expanding on this idea, Jacobs and Kleban (2003) note that when electorates have more 
direct influence on laws impacting the level of punitiveness, more severe penalties are 
imposed.  
 Modernization is a function of socioeconomic development and is characterized 
by increased urbanization and industrialization, with modernizing countries 
experiencing similar trajectories (Shelley 1981). Increased complexity in the division of 
labor results in weakening of societal bonds and control and higher crime rates. Larger 
urban populations bring together greater numbers of strangers in places lacking social 
control (Felson and Boba 2010). Modernization tends to increase violent behavior, as 
rural youth having the “tradition of settling disputes violently” (Neapolitan 1997:69) are 
brought together in urban areas.  
While not addressing directly levels of punitiveness, Shelley (1986) provides 
insight into the relationship between modernization and crime, and ultimately, 
punishment. Countries experiencing modernization have similar trajectories with 
increasing crime rates, noting that “[o]nly political, religious, and economic controls 
exercised by the society over its members appear sufficiently strong to avert the 
consequences of modernization” (Shelley 1981:142). However, upon reexamination of 
the relationship between modernization and crime, Shelley (1986) acknowledges 
differences in trajectories. Shelley notes that the relationship between modernization 
and crime is “complex,” and is impacted by “historical, cultural and political traditions” 




modernizing countries, Neapolitan (1997) notes rates of change and level of 
development influence crime rates (p. 69). Noting that punishment is society’s response 
to criminal behavior, Shelley (1986) calls it a “collective act that reflects the historical, 
cultural and religious traditions of a society” (p. 17). 
World-systems 
Wallerstein (1974; 1976) characterizes the world-system as a cyclical, three-tiered 
capitalistic economic structure, based on a system of unequal exchange. The system 
consists of “all of the economic, political, social, and cultural relations among the 
people of the earth” (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995:389). An international division of 
labor exists both between and within these tiers. The dominant position in this tier 
system is the core, consisting of countries exhibiting capital-intensive industrial 
activities, using skilled and highly-paid labor (Chase-Dunn 1998:346). At the other end 
of the spectrum are peripheral countries, characterized by poorly-paid, labor-intensive 
activities, often in agricultural areas (Chase-Dunn 1998:347). Semiperiphery countries, 
countries between the core and periphery, exhibit both core and periphery 
characteristics (Chase-Dunn 1998:347).  
 Core states enjoy greater economic, political, and military strength. They have 
greater diversity in trade options with each other, and with semiperiphery and periphery 
countries. In that regard, core countries use raw materials from countries in the 
periphery, and more labor-intensive goods and services from the semiperiphery. Those 
in the semiperiphery are exploited by the core and are exploiters of the periphery. The 
semiperiphery position acts as a buffer between the core and the periphery. Periphery 




to the needs of the core and semiperiphery (Wallerstein 1974; Wallerstein 1976). 
Additionally, periphery countries must rely on core countries for capital investment and 
manufactured goods (Clark and Beckfield 2009:6). 
 Over the past several decades, research has validated the existence of a 
relatively stable, three-tiered world-system. Snyder and Kick (1979) examine network 
relations; Babones (2005) examines country-level income structures; and Clark and 
Beckfield (2009), and Clark (2012) examine global trade network densities, in 
confirming the existence of three tiers.  Snyder and Kick’s study examines network 
connections between nations regarding trade, military interventions, diplomatic 
connections, and conjoint partnerships in treaties. Their analysis provided strong 
support for a three-tiered structure for 118 countries in 1965 (Snyder and Kick 
1979:1123). Babones (2005) provides graphic evidence of three areas of concentration 
for national income levels at 5-year intervals from 1975-2000 for 103 countries (pp. 46-
48). Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) analysis confirms and updates Snyder and Kick’s 
orthodox measure. Clark’s (2012) measure presents WSP for countries as recently as 
the 1990s. Others have noted some variation on the above. In their study, York and 
Ergas use a ten-block, or ten-tiered, system from research conducted by Kick and others 
(2011, cited in York and Ergas 2011).  
Chase-Dunn (1998) posits that between the poles of the core and periphery, the 
semiperiphery exists in a continuum of development, rather than an easily identifiable 
third category (p. 13). Chase-Dunn notes “periods of concentration and dispersion of 
power and wealth, to experience uneven development” (p. 202), as the core exploits the 




well be that there are differences in social dynamics demonstrated at the various levels 
(Burns et al. 1994).  
Viewed from this macro level, there is an interrelationship and interdependence 
within all three tiers of WSP. Inequality is exacerbated in Third World countries, 
generally those countries in the periphery, by foreign capital penetration from 
transnational corporations, as noted by Crenshaw (1992). The exploitation of the 
periphery results in “social disorganization, anomie, urban poverty, income inequality, 
discrimination, and deprivation – the factors that are strongly correlated with high levels 
of crime and violence” (Shahidullah 2014:70). Research by Mahutga, Kwon, and 
Grainger (2011) also indicates that position in the world-system impacts the level of 
within-country inequality (p. 281). This function occurs when “alliances [are formed] 
between ruling classes in core and non-core countries” (Mahutga et al. 2011:283). 
These relationships and the presence of “[d]irect economic penetration and control over 
the production activities . . . at an artificially low [price]” (Rubinson 1976:642) are 
mechanisms of core exploitation. Non-core countries also tend to lack effective 
mechanisms to protect “the capital and organization” present when the demand for raw 
materials are no longer needed (Rubinson 1976:642). 
Scholars find that position in the world-systems hierarchy impacts a variety of 
ecological and social outcomes. Burns et al. (1994) examine the relationship of world-
systems position and deforestation as an environmental outcome. Dyches and Rushing 
(1996) evaluate world-systems position and its influence on women’s health. Burns, 
Davis, and Kick (1997) examine the relationship of world-systems position and 




position on gender inequality. Ergas and York (2012) control for world-systems 
position in their analysis of women’s status and carbon dioxide emissions.  
Although not addressing incarceration rates, crime rates grew for almost 30 
years, as the world economy grew, according to Shahidullah (2014).  Various regions 
were impacted differently, in part, due to position in the global economy (p. 71). 
Statistics from the United Nations indicate that “[t]he total reported crime rate . . . 
increased in the peripheral economies . . . although it declined in the core countries” 
(Shahidullah 2014:71). There is no observation about the impact within semiperiphery 
countries.   
While other research is extant regarding the influence of WSP on various social 
outcomes, this study examines the effect of position in the world-system on differences 
between countries regarding incarceration rates, inequality, wealth, democracy, 
urbanization, and other variables over the past two decades.     
For purposes of this study, I use the distinct three-tier system postulated by 
Wallerstein and subsequently confirmed by others as noted above. Specifically, I use 
the most current assessment of world-systems position provide by Clark (2012).  
Hypothesis One: Position in the world-system is associated with positive and negative 
social outcomes. Countries in the core have greater wealth, democracy, urbanization, 
and educational attainment than semiperipheral and peripheral countries. However, 
countries in the periphery will have greater incarceration rates, inequality, homicide 







Inequality exists in many forms across the world. Inequality is the unequal distribution 
of valued resources. The concentration of wealth and income in the hands of a few 
indicates inequality. Often income inequality results in a concentration of power in 
those same societies. Examining inequality in the distribution of income within nations, 
Kuznets (1955) posits inequality increases as traditional societies transition from 
markets based on agriculture to those based on industrial output. Industrial economies 
tend to generate higher incomes than agricultural economies. As workers in the 
agricultural sector move from rural to urban settings to secure higher paying jobs in 
nonagricultural jobs, inequality within the country increases. Additionally, income 
inequality is greater within this urban, industrial economy, as those moving into the 
sector tend to fill lower-income groups within the urban population (Kuznets 1955:17). 
Income tends to concentrate when industrialization and urbanization increase. For the 
three countries included in his study, Kuznets (1955) finds a pattern of increasing 
inequality as countries move into industrialization. As the proportion of native-born 
urbanites increases, inequality tends to decrease as they are better able to navigate the 
economic landscape of urban settings (Kuznets 1955:17). The question of Kuznets’ 
assertion of this curvilinear relationship is not a part of the current study, but provides 
us with a base from which others have studied the phenomenon.  
 Scholars have examined the impact of inequality on numerous social outcomes. 
In many cases as inequality increases, various social issues are negatively affected. 
There is a lack of maternal medical care associated with increased inequality (Shandra, 




inequality grows (Buchman 1996). Food security is reduced when there is greater 
inequality (Jenkins and Scanlan 2001). Human rights violations are higher with 
increased inequality (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006).  Wilkinson and Pickett (2007) 
note that in 24 of the world’s richest countries overall educational outcomes decreased 
with greater inequality. Furthermore, Babones (2008) finds that increased inequality in 
developed and developing countries is associated with a reduction in life expectancy 
and an increase in infant mortality.  
 Inequality is an indicator of the concentration of power. That power manifests 
itself through social, political, and economic forces, which in turn, influence the 
definitions of crime and the punishments imposed (Quinney 1969). As Quinney (1969) 
describes a sociological theory of interests, he notes that society is “characterized by 
diversity, conflict, coercion, and change” (p. 25). Discussing the differences in power, 
Quinney (1975) asserts that the definitions of crime are “created by agents of the 
dominant class” (p. 37). Agents enact laws, and the criminal justice system enforces 
laws that protect the interests of the dominant class. The “coercive force of the state, 
embodied in law and legal repression, is the traditional means of maintaining the social 
and economic order” (Quinney 1980:52). In his examination of the history of vagrancy 
laws, Chambliss (1964) notes that laws “control the undesirable, the criminal and the 
‘nuisance’” (p. 76); generally those lacking social, political, or economic power. 
 Others note the control exerted by the criminal justice system on some members 
of society. Spitzer (1975b) notes culture produces those who exist at its margins and are 
not productive members of society. Spitzer differentiates two categories of marginalized 




elderly and infirm. The other group consists of those who are younger and alienated, 
who have greater volatility and may pose a greater threat. The latter category Spitzer 
(1975b) refers to as social dynamite, a group more apt to encounter the formal legal 
process and face imprisonment (p. 643-44). 
 Inequality also impacts the ability of portions of populations to access valued 
resources within societies. Strain theorists have long held that the inability to achieve 
societally accepted goals result in negative responses, including criminal responses 
(Merton 1938; Agnew 1992). Researchers examining differences in crime between 
immigrants and native-born people in Sweden note that much of the variation in crime 
is due to the lack of access to resources for immigrants (Hällsten, Szulkin, and Sarnecki 
2013:472). In the United States, researchers note that the increase in the incidence of 
violent crimes is associated with income inequality (Kawachi, Kennedy, and Wilkinson 
1999). Inequality also impacts the level of punishment imposed.  
The following provides an overview of research conducted that examines the 
influence of inequality on incarceration rates among nations. Many of these scholars 
find statistically significant relationships between inequality and incarceration rates 
with greater inequality associated with higher incarceration rates (Killias 1986; Wilkins 
and Pease 1987; Krus and Hoehl 1994; Wilkinson and Pickett 2007; Lappi-Seppälä 
2008; DeMichele 2010; Lappi-Seppälä 2010; Miller 2011; Healy, Mulcahy, and 
O’Donnell 2013). On the other hand, the influence of inequality on incarceration rates is 
not significant in studies by other scholars (Neapolitan 2001; Jacobs and Kleban 2003; 




Scholars finding a positive relationship between inequality and incarceration 
rates examine a variety of countries, often from the same region of the world. Among 
those, Killias (1986) uses the Gini index as a measure of power concentration in his 
study of 55 countries in 1972. In their study of six countries during the mid-1980s, 
Wilkins and Pease (1987) find a positive correlation between income differential and 
the length of sentence imposed. Using the ratio of income received by the top 10 
percent to that received by the bottom 20 percent of households as a measure of 
inequality, Krus and Hoehl (1994) conduct regression analysis with a sample of 30 
countries from 1989-1991. Examining 24 of the world’s 50 wealthiest countries, 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2007) find a strong positive correlation between inequality, 
measured as the ratio of income received by the richest 20 percent to that received by 
the poorest 20 percent, and incarceration rates. In his 2008 study, Lappi-Seppälä does 
two things: he examines 25 countries from 1980-2005 and conducts a cross-sectional 
analysis of 99 countries in 2005. Findings indicate a positive correlation between 
inequality and incarceration rates, and he notes the strength of the correlation increased 
from 1987 to 2000. Lappi-Seppälä (2008) also indicates the impact of inequality is 
influenced by country-specific differences. In a study using a larger sample, Lappi-
Seppälä (2010) notes a positive relationship between inequality and imprisonment rates 
for EU members, but results were not significant when examining non-EU and non-
OECD countries. Finding a strong correlation between economic inequality and levels 
of punitiveness, Van Kesteren (2009) uses 23 Western countries from 1980 to 2000. 
Van Kesteren (2009) expands his research to 56 countries in four regions and confirms 




increased punishment. Miller (2011) uses Gini coefficients as a measure of 
marginalization. She finds a strong positive relationship between marginalization and 
incarceration rates. Another study finding a positive correlation between inequality and 
incarceration is presented by Healy et al. (2013).  
Others find limited support for the positive relationship between inequality and 
incarceration.  Neapolitan (2001) uses single observations for incarceration rates for 148 
countries from Walmsley’s 1999 World Prison Population Lists for years 1994-1998, 
and uses the Gini index for 125 countries from 1986-1996, and finds while inequality 
produces a positive coefficient, it was not statistically significant. His evaluation finds a 
positive relationship between homicide rates and incarceration rates. Neapolitan (2001) 
limits the number of countries in his study due to the limited coverage for his 
explanatory variables.  
Examining the impact of corporatist and federalist policies within progressive 
democracies, Jacobs and Kleban (2003) use a sample of 13 countries from 1970-1995. 
In their analysis, Jacobs and Kleban (2003) note inequality does not produce a 
significant result. Another study in which inequality fails to produce a significant result 
is Ruddell (2005), in which he examines 100 wealthy countries in the early 2000s.   
Many of the above studies use smaller sample sizes due to the availability, or 
lack thereof, of sufficient data with which to run analyses (Killias 1986; Krus and Hoehl 
1994). Alternatively, some researchers examine developed countries (Jacobs and 
Kleban 2003; Wilkinson and Pickett 2007; Lappi-Seppälä 2008; Van Kesteren 2009; 
Miller 2011),  and regional neighbors (Wilkins and Pease 1987; DeMichele 2013 ) for 




2005; Lappi-Seppälä 2008; Lappi-Seppälä 2010). In these larger samples, inequality 
generally fails to attain significance.  
The current study tests the relationship between income inequality and 
incarceration rates, and controls for homicide rates and drug offense rates for 77 
countries from 1994-2008, net of other variables. Controlling for drug offense rates, 
while reducing the sample size, provides insight into the importance of the allocation of 
resources for less serious offenses. Additionally, I examine the influence of world-
systems position on incarceration rates and the other variables listed as predictor and 
control variables.  
As Neapolitan (2001) notes, the addition of variables in international studies 
limits the number of countries available for analysis due to the lack of full coverage for 
all countries of interest for all variables of interest. Specifically, when I add my drug 
offense variable, I lose many countries for which I have other variables. However, 
examining the influence of drug offense rates on incarceration rates provides insight 
into countries’ discretionary prosecutorial patterns.  
My sample of 77 countries has at least 4 countries from each of the 6 regions of 
the world. These 77 countries also consist of 18 countries from the periphery, 19 from 
the semiperiphery, and 40 from the core.  
 See Table 1 below for a synopsis of the above-listed research with findings as 





Table 1. Studies of Income Inequality and Incarceration. 
Author(s) Sample Period Findings 
Killias (1986) 55 countries 1972-1975 Unemployment rates and inequality explain a substantial 
amount of the variation in incarceration. Relationship with 
crime rates tenuous. 




1970s-1980s Relative extreme wealth associated with the strongest 
correlation. Noted that in England and Wales reductions in 
crime did not result in lower incarceration. 
Krus & Hoehl 
(1994) 
30 countries 1989-1991 Unequal distribution of wealth demonstrated the strongest 
correlation with incarceration rates. Family disintegration 
produced the next strongest correlation. 
Neapolitan 
(2001) 
148 countries 1994-1998 Lack of significance for civilization, inequality, or 
unemployment as explanatory variables. Significance was 
demonstrated for homicide rates and street enforcement 
with the addition of regional dummy variables. 





1970-1995 Differences in type of democracy (corporatist v. federalist) 
and internal ethnic threat impact incarceration rates. 
Homicide rate and percent minority, GDPPC, and percent 
minority are significant control variables, while inequality 
is not. 
Ruddell (2005) 100 countries 2000-2001 Higher incarceration rates were associated with homicides, 




24 of the 50 
richest 
countries 










Increased income inequality produces greater incarceration, 
although the results are not significant in his global sample. 





1989-2000 Countries with the greatest inequality have the highest 
levels of punitiveness. GDPPC and educational attainment 
unrelated to the level of punitiveness. 
DeMichele 
(2010) 
17 countries 1960-2002 Strong positive correlation between inequality and 







Mid-2000s Inverse relationship between crime and incarceration rates. 
Higher correlation between inequality and incarceration 
rates in EU and OECD states. 
Greater spending and greater trust correlated to lower 
incarceration rates. 
Miller (2011) 52 countries 2008 Lack of correlation between crime and incarceration rates.  
Greater inequality and higher percentage living below 50 





26 countries Mid-2000s Strong positive correlation between inequality and 
incarceration rates 
 





CHAPTER 2. DATA AND METHODS 
The following provides a description of the variables used in this analysis. In total, the 
panel data span a 24-year period, from 1990 through 2013.   
Dependent Variable 
Incarceration rates. I use incarceration rates as a measure of penal severity. 
“Imprisonment has uncontested prominence as the principal and most severe sanction in 
European and industrialized Western countries” (Lappi-Seppälä 2008:321).  Beginning 
with the first published World Prison Population List in 1999, Roy Walmsley (1999; 
2000; 2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2005; 2007; 2009; 2011; 2013) has prepared and published 
ten editions of the list, most recently at the end of 2013. Data provided in the first 
edition dates back to data collected as early as 1993, and the tenth edition contains data 
collected as recently as October 2013. Although extensive in its coverage, Walmsley 
(1999) notes limitations regarding differences in techniques and practices in gathering 
and reporting in different countries. Some countries included incarcerated juveniles and 
pretrial detainees in their total incarcerations; while others like China, report only those 
sentenced and not those in administrative detention (Walmsley 2002). In the earlier 
editions, Walmsley notes that the incarceration rates reported per 100,000 of the 
population and rounded to the nearest five to avoid the appearance of precision (1999). 
That practice changed in the fourth edition in 2003, although Walmsley continues to 
note that the reported populations used for calculations are estimates. I limit the scope 
of my investigation to those independent countries with populations exceeding 1 million 




 Walmsley consistently reports incarceration rates for most countries. However, 
the rates are not updated annually, and Walmsley lists the actual date of the rate 
reported, which is the date I use in my analysis. I note two entries for Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Federation and Republika Srpska) beginning in 1999. According to the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (N.d.), Republika Srpska and 
Federation are second-tier governments under the internationally recognized Bosnia-
Herzegovina umbrella. I report a pooled figure using both figures reported and divided 
by the reported populations. Bulgaria and Slovakia had two rates recorded for the year 
1998 (in the 1999 and 2000 reports). I used the most recent figures and reported them 
for the year 1998. For the United Kingdom, I compute the rate based on reported 
incarcerations for England and Wales and those for Northern Ireland and Scotland and 
divide by the reported populations for each of the reporting years. The most recent 
incarceration rate reported for Azerbaijan includes pre-trial detainees not reported in 
previous computations (Walmsley 2013).  
The following countries have only one entry for incarceration rates: Laos, 
Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, and Timor-Leste. Incarceration rates range from a high of 756 
in the United States in 2007 to a low of 25 per 100,000 in Indonesia in 1997 and in 
Indonesia in 1999 and 2000. The United States has maintained the highest incarceration 
rates for the group of countries included in this analysis since surpassing the Russian 
Federation in 1999. I log incarceration rates to correct for skewness. When a dependent 
variable is logged, the interpretation of regression analysis changes. Rather than unit 
increases in the independent variable resulting in unit increases in the dependent 




percentage increases in the dependent variables. See Figures 1 and 2 for the distribution 
of incarceration rates and the log of incarceration rates, respectively.  
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Figure 2. Incarceration Rates per 100,000 (logged). 
 
Independent Variables 
Inequality measure. Gini indices are from the Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID) version 4.0 dataset prepared by Solt (2009). The goal of SWIID is to 
maximize “the comparability of income inequality statistics for the largest possible 
sample of countries and years” (Solt 2009:232). Starting with the U.N. University’s 
World Income Inequality Database, Solt uses a missing-data algorithm to standardize 
the database and provide comparable Gini indices for 153 countries for all available 
years since 1960. He uses the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS) as the standard by 
which he compares the SWIID. SWIID provides both Gini net, reflecting the square 
root scale of household disposable income, and Gini market, the square root scale of 
household gross (pre-tax, pretransfer) income. Gini coefficients are computed based on 
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area below the line of income equality (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2006). The Gini index is a measure of inequality that ranges from 0 to 
100, with 0 indicating income equality within the population, and 100 indicating that a 
single person receives all of the income (Solt 2009:234). Assessing the quality of the 
data set, Solt notes that there are regional differences in the amount and quality of data 
from which the calculations were performed.  Developing countries in Latin America, 
the Caribbean, and Africa have the largest standard errors due to a lack of data for many 
countries in those regions (Solt 2009:238).  
For purposes of this study, I use SWIID 4.0’s Gini net computation, the square 
root scale of household disposable income. See Figure 3 below for the distribution of 
the Gini (net) variable. 
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For most countries, SWIID 4.0 provides data from 1990 through 2011. The 
following countries had less than 20 years of coverage for the inequality measure, with 
the years covered indicated in parentheses: Albania (1996-2008), Algeria (1990-2005), 
Angola (1995-2008), Azerbaijan (1990-2008), Benin (2003-2006), Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(1991-2007), Botswana (1990-2005), Burkina Faso (1994-2009), Burundi (1992-2006), 
Cambodia (1994-2009), Cameroon (1990-2007), Central African Republic (1992-2008), 
Chad (2002-2005), Republic of the Congo (2005-2006), Cote d’Ivoire (1990-2008), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (2005-2006), Egypt (1990-2008), Gabon (1990-1992, 
2005), Gambia (1992-2003), Ghana (1990-2006), Guatemala (1990-2006), Guinea 
(1991-2007), Guinea-Bissau (1991-2005), Haiti (1990-2001), India (1990-2009), Iraq 
(2003-2004), Jamaica (1990-2004), Kenya (1990-2005), Laos (1992-2008), Lebanon 
(1997-2005), Lesotho (1990-2005), Liberia (2005-2007), Mauritania (1990-2008), 
Mongolia (1995-2007), Morocco (1990-2007), Mozambique (1996-2007), Namibia 
(1993-2005), Nicaragua (1992-2009), Niger (1992-2007), Papua New Guinea (1995-
2005), Swaziland (1994-2009), Tanzania (1990-2007), Timor-Leste (2001-2007), Togo 
(2005-2011), Trinidad and Tobago (1990-2005), Turkmenistan (1990-2005), 
Uzbekistan (1990-2005), Vietnam (1992-2010), Yemen (1992-2005), and Zimbabwe 
(1990-1995).  
World-systems position. World-systems position is from Clark’s (2012) calculations 
updating Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) three-tiered trade-based measure. According to 
Clark, core states are those possessing the densest trade and economic ties (2012:372). 
Core states trade with other core states, semiperipheral states, and peripheral states. 




military power (Wallerstein 1974). Peripheral countries, on the other hand, have limited 
options for trade, they are isolated from one another, and are exploited by both the core 
and semiperiphery (Clark and Beckfield 2009:12). The mid-level status, the 
semiperiphery, acts as a buffer between the two poles (Wallerstein 1974), and is 
exploited by the core, as it exploits the periphery (Clark and Beckfield 2009:12).  
Although some movement in position occurs from Clark and Beckfield’s (2009) 
analysis covering the decade of the 1980s to Clark’s (2012) updated analysis of the 
1990s, which is prior to part of the time frame used in this analysis, world-systems 
position is relatively stable over time. I use the updated data for each country-year.  
There are 57 countries in the periphery, 30 countries in the semiperiphery, and 
45 countries in the core for a total of 132 of the 139 countries for which I have other 
data. The following countries do not have world-systems positions for either the decade 
of the 1980s (Clark and Beckfield 2009) or the 1990s (Clark 2012): Botswana, Hong 
Kong, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Taiwan, and Timor-Leste. I use dummy variables 
for each of the three world-systems positions in my analysis.  
I observe the movement of several, although not exhaustive, noteworthy 
countries relative to their position in the world-system. A group of countries, Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa, referred to collectively as BRICS, are all located 
in Clark’s (2012) core. However, these countries held positions in the periphery and 
semiperiphery according to other authors. All of the listed countries demonstrate 
mobility in the world-system while the United Kingdom and the United States maintain 
core positions throughout. Interestingly, the BRICS group recently established the New 




and serve as an alternative to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Romeo 
2015). See Table 2 below for the BRICS countries and the U.S. and U.K. classifications 
in various studies. 




















Brazil P SP SP SC C C 
Russia SP SP   C C 
India P P  SP C C 
China P P  SC C C 
South 
Africa 
C SP SP SP P C 
United 
Kingdom 
C C  C C C 
United 
States 
C C  C C C 





























Table 3. Countries by World-Systems Position. 
Periphery Semiperiphery Core 
Albania Algeria Austria 
Armenia Colombia Belgium 
Bolivia Costa Rica Bulgaria 
Dominican Republic Cote d’Ivoire Canada 
El Salvador Croatia Chile 
Estonia Ecuador China 
Jamaica Kazakhstan Czech Republic 
Kyrgyzstan Kenya Denmark 
Mauritius Latvia Finland 
Moldova Lithuania France 
Mongolia Morocco Germany 
Nepal Panama Greece 
Nicaragua Peru Hungary 
Papua New Guinea Philippines India 
Paraguay Slovakia Ireland 
Tajikistan Slovenia Indonesia 
Uganda Sri Lanka Israel 
Zambia Uruguay Italy 
 Venezuela Japan 
  Republic of Korea 
  Malaysia 
  Mexico 
  Netherlands 
  New Zealand 
  Norway 
  Pakistan 
  Poland 
  Portugal 
  Romania 
  Russian Federation 
  Singapore 
  South Africa 
  Spain 
  Sweden 
  Switzerland 
  Thailand 
  Turkey 
  Ukraine 
  United Kingdom 
  United States of America 
   
 
Gross domestic product per capita. I use gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) 
for each country, based on purchasing power parity, as a measure of economic 
development (Clark 2011). It stands to reason that at higher levels of development, 
additional funds are available to use for incarceration costs. These data were collected 
from World Bank (N.d.a) data. The figures are in constant 2011 international dollars 
and are indicative of the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar in the United States. The 




 The following countries have notably fewer years reported: Argentina and 
Taiwan have no GDPPC reported, Timor-Leste’s GDPPC is reported for 1999 through 
2013, and Eastern European countries Croatia and Estonia had no GDPPC reported 
from 1990 through 1994. I log the variable to reduce skew. See Figures 4 and 5 for 
distribution of GDPPC and GDPPC (logged), respectively.  
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Figure 5. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (logged).  
 
Democracy. Freedom House (2014a) provides two indicators of democracy in their 
most recent Freedom in the World publication. Measuring political rights and civil 
liberties on a 1-7 scale, with 1 indicating most free and 7 least free for both indicators. 
The political rights rating is indicative of the level of self-government and political 
participation of populations, ranging from having free and fair elections to having 
severe government oppression. Civil liberties ratings assess freedoms of expression, 
assembly, association, education, and religion, and the rule of law. The country ratings 
and status scores for years 1973-2013 are available. I use those from 1990-2013. I 
average the two scores and invert them indicating that those countries with scores of 7 
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 Freedom House (2014b) ratings are not available for Hong Kong; and are 
missing for some of the covered period for Laos (missing 2009-2012), Serbia (missing 
1990-2005), Timor-Leste (missing 1990-2000), and Turkmenistan (missing 2007-2012).  
Age cohort. Data for this variable are from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (N.d.b). They indicate the percentage of the population between the ages of 
15 and 64 for each of the countries for each year listed. The greater the proportion of the 
population between ages 15 and 64, the higher the percentage of the population 
available for incarceration, and the greater the percentage of the population available for 
employment. Additionally, there may be an increased demand placed on societal 
resources as a greater proportion of the population attains reproductive maturity. 
I use data covering 1990 through 2012 for all but a few of the countries in my 
dataset. No data are available for Timor-Leste for the covered years, and data are 
missing for Turkmenistan for the year 2007 through 2012. Several other countries lack 
data for 2012 only.  
 Examining the distribution for this variable indicates a bimodal grouping of 











Figure 6. Percentage of Population ages 15 through 64.  
 
 
Urbanization. From the World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), I use data 
for the percentage of the population residing in urban areas by country (World Bank 
2015). Data cover all of the years addressed in this analysis.  
 No data for Taiwan were available. See Figure 7 for the distribution of 
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Figure 7. Percentage of Population Residing in Urban Areas.  
 
Physical integrity rights index. The physical integrity rights index provides a scale 
indicating the level to which individual governments respect certain human rights. 
Cingranelli and Richards (1999) examine the incidence of torture, extrajudicial killing, 
political imprisonment, and disappearance within countries and construct an eight-point 
scale, combining the scores from each of the listed categories.  The indicators are 
totaled and indicate governmental respect for those rights with 0 indicating no respect 
for physical integrity rights and 8 meaning full respect for those rights (Cingranelli, 
Richards, and Clay 2014).  
Cingranelli and Richards use the annual human rights reports produced by the 
U.S. State Department and Amnesty International (Cingranelli and Richards 1999:409). 
The dataset encompassing the years 1981-2011 for 202 countries is from the CIRI 
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“[i]t is designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the 
causes and consequences of human rights violations” (Cingranelli et al. 2014). This 
analysis uses only data from as early as 1990 through 2011, when available, for 138 of 
the 139 countries chosen for evaluation. Hong Kong has no scores.  
Some former Soviet satellites do not have data for the early 1990s. There are no 
data for Bosnia-Herzegovina before 2001; and Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Serbia prior to 1992 and with Serbia also 
missing data from 2000-2002. The following lack data from some of the years under 
investigation: The Democratic Republic of Congo from 1992-2000, Lebanon before 
2000, Liberia from 1990-1995, Sierra Leone 1997-2000 and 2009, andTimor-Leste 
1990-2000 and 2001. Serbia’s scores are from both the Serbia entries and those of 
Serbia-Montenegro.  
Educational attainment. Educational attainment comes from Barro and Lee’s (2013a) 
updated data for 146 countries from 1950 through 2010 at 5-year intervals. They 
provide the percentage of the population aged 15 and over that has completed primary, 
secondary and tertiary education (Barro and Lee 2013b). I choose secondary completion 
for those aged 15 and over as a proxy for stock of human capital within countries. Using 
the percentages at each 5-year interval, I average the change over time and impute the 
change in the intervening years for each of the countries in my sample. I produce a total 
of 2562 observations based on Barro and Lee’s data.  
Due to the positive skew of the distribution, I add one to each of the percentages 




attainment and its logged component, both are skewed, as is noted in the following 
figures. See Figures 8 and 9 for the distribution of percentages and logged percentages, 
respectively. Since logging the variable fails to correct for skewness, I use the variable 
in its original form. 
 The following countries were not covered: Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  
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Figure 9. Percent of Population 15+ Completing Secondary Education (logged).  
 
 
Homicide rates. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has 
compiled data on homicide rates. The UNODC collects rates from reports of the World 
Health Organization, the UN’s Crime Trends Surveys, Interpol, and national police. 
UNODC defines intentional homicide as unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a 
person by another person. I use homicide rates from as early as 1990 through 2011 from 
the UNODC website (UNODC N.d.a; UNODC N.d.b).  
 I use homicide rates as a proxy for overall crime rates. Homicide is the most 
consistently and broadly reported offense, and one least susceptible to differences in 
crime definition from country to country (Bourguignon 2001:173). Those conducting 
cross-national studies often use homicide rates as a proxy for overall crime rates for the 
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Seppälä 2010). Additionally, homicide is deemed wrong in itself, or malum in se (Hill 
and Hill 2009:261).  
As this variable is also skewed, see Figure 10 below, I have added one to each 
rate and logged the variable to normalize the distribution, seen in Figure 11 below.  
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Figure 11. Homicide Rates (logged).
 
 
Drug offense rates. Unlike the offense of homicide, drug offenses are considered mala 
prohibita, illegal at certain times based on societies’ definitions, literally, wrong 
because we deem them to be so (Hill and Hill 2009:261). Although noted as an 
appropriate indicator of drug problems within countries, drug offenses “are generated 
by institutional and legal systems that differ across countries, making them even more 
difficult to compare” (Kilmer, Reuter, and Giommoni 2015:227). The inclusion of this 
category adds the discretionary component of enforcement and punishment for offenses 
for which certain groups may be disproportionately targeted.  
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime at Vienna has also compiled 
data on drug-related offenses in their Surveys of Crime Trends. For waves 1-10 of the 
surveys, data are housed with the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
















addition, the UNODC website has historical data covering 2003-2008 for drug-related 
crime rates. The UNODC website notes that surveys are sent out to member countries, 
but responses are voluntary. Not all countries are covered for all of the noted years, and 
some countries have no data reported. 
 Wave 5 of the Surveys of Crime Trends covers years 1990-1994 and provides 
total drug offenses and country populations for the countries responding to the surveys. 
I calculate drug offense rates per 100,000 given the data. Wave 6 of the survey covers 
years 1995-1997 for 83 countries and reports total recorded drug offenses. However, 
neither country populations, nor drug offense rates per 100,000 are available for those 
years. In order to calculate drug offense rates, I use country populations for the 
countries covered during the years 1995-1997 from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, and use the formula noted above. Data for the United 
Kingdom are reported separately for Great Britain and Wales, Northern Ireland, and 
Scotland. I combine the three and compute the rate for the whole.  
Covering years 1998-2000, Wave 7 reports total drug offenses per 100,000 and 
provides 180 observations for the countries included in this study. Wave 8 covers years 
2001 and 2002 and provides 82 observations.  
For the years 2003 through 2008, I use a combination of data provided in the 
next two waves of the CTS and the historical documentation available for those years 
on the UNODC website. Where conflicting data occur, I use the UNODC historical data 
for consistency for those years.  
From the above, the U.S. has data for 1995-1999. Additional information 




Annual Arrests by Year and Category table on the DrugWarFacts.org (N.d) web page. 
Historical FBI data is sourced on the web page and covers the following years: 1990 
and 2000 through 2008. Rates are calculated using population totals from World Bank 
WDI data. See figures 12 and 13 below for histograms of drug offense rates and the 
logged variable.  
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Ethnic fractionalization. Fearon (2003) constructs a measure of ethnic fractionalization, 
“defined as the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will 
be different ethnic groups” (p. 208). The formula used by Fearon (2003:208) for 
calculating fractionalization, for ethnic groups p1, p2, . . ., pn is: 





Each country’s ethnic fractionalization is computed on the number of ethnic groups 
larger than one percent of that country’s population. Fearon (2003) uses 822 ethnic 
groups in 160 countries for his calculations for an average of five ethnic groups (p. 
204). The resulting fractionalization scores are .953 and 1, respectively. 
Fractionalization scores range from .004 (Republic of Korea) to 1 and are time invariant 




effect regression to show the impact of ethnic fractionalization on incarceration rates at 
the mid-point of the analysis.  
Papua New Guinea has highly fractionalized ethnic groups that do not meet the 
one percent of the country population threshold in place for Fearon (2003:205). No 
ethnic fractionalization scores were available for Hong Kong, Serbia, or Timor-Leste. 
According to Jacobs and Kleban (2003), perceptions of racial or ethnic threat increased 
incarceration rates (p. 725). See Figure 14 for the distribution of ethnic fractionalization 
scores.  
Figure 14. Ethnic Fractionalization.
 
 
Percentage male. From the World Bank World Development Indicators (N.d.c), I use 
the percentage of the total population that is female, by country, for 1990-2013 for 138 
countries. Data for Taiwan are not available. I then construct the percentage of the 





















The distribution is relatively normal. The larger the percentage male, the greater the 
incidence of violent crime and incarceration.  
As noted, country coverage for many of the listed variables varies and limits the 
final sample size. When examined for incarceration rates, each listed 
explanatory/control variable, region of the world, and world-system position, my final 
sample size consists of 77 countries. See Table 4 below for the descriptive statistics for 
the variables listed above.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Incarceration Rates 325   172.0 137.14 25 756 
Incarceration Rates (logged) 325 4.9 .68 3.2 6.6 
Inequality 325 34.6 9.60 16.2 75.3 
GDPPC 325 22789.7 15062.51 1040.2 64573.2 
GDPPC (log) 325 9.7 .90 6.94 11.07 
Democracy 325 5.9 1.33 1 7 
Percentage Between 15-64 325 66.1 3.77 48.3 70.7 
Percent Urban 325 66.7 17.09 13.5 100 
Physical Integrity 325 5.9 1.98 0 8 
Percent Completed Sec Ed 325 33.9 14.37 4.6 71.8 
Homicide Rate 325 5.6 9.85 .46 62.5 
Homicide Rate (log) 325 1.4 .82 .38 4.2 
Drug Offense Rates 325 148.5 197.76 .12 987.1 
Drug Offense Rates (log) 325 4.1 1.52 .11 6.9 
Ethnic Fractionalization 325 .3 .23 .004 1 
Percent Male 325 48.9 1.09 45.8 51.8 
 
Regions. Following Clark (2011; 2012), I construct six regional dummy variables: (1) 
the West (excluded as the referent category) consisting of 18 countries, (2) East Asia 
and the Pacific (EAP) consisting of 14 countries, (3) Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(EECA) with 20 countries, (4) Latin America (LA) with 15 countries, (5) the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) consisting of 4 countries, and (6) Sub-Saharan Africa 







Table 5. Countries by Region. 
West EAP EECA Latin America MENA SSA 
Austria China Albania Bolivia Algeria Cote d'Ivoire 
Belgium India Armenia Chile Israel Kenya 
Canada Indonesia Bulgaria Colombia Morocco Mauritius 
Denmark Japan Croatia Costa Rica Turkey South Africa 
Finland Rep of Korea Czech Rep Dom Rep  Uganda 
France Malaysia Estonia Ecuador  Zambia 
Germany Mongolia Greece El Salvador   
Ireland Nepal Hungary Jamaica   
Italy Pakistan Kazakhstan Mexico   
Netherlands PNG Kyrgyzstan Nicaragua   
New Zealand Philippines Latvia Panama   
Norway Singapore Lithuania Paraguay   
Portugal Sri Lanka Moldova Peru   
Spain Thailand Poland Uruguay   
Sweden  Romania Venezuela   
Switzerland  Russian Federation    
UK  Slovakia    
USA  Slovenia    
  Tajikistan    
  Ukraine    
      
Source: Clark (2011) 
Year. My data contain up to 24 consecutive years (1990-2013) for most of my 
independent variables. To evaluate or control for my time-invariant independent 
variables in fixed-effects models, I interact the variable with my standardized year 
(mean = 0). This enables me to assess WSP, and control for ethnic fractionalization, and 
region using fixed-effects modeling. The main effect of the time-invariant variables 
refers to the middle of the sample period (cf. Clark 2012:376).   
While I begin this data set with as many as 139 countries providing 
incarceration rates from 1993 through 2013, each time I add variables, the sample size 
decreases. This limitation is noted by many, but specifically, I note Neapolitan’s (2001) 
study in which his initial sample decreases due to the lack of coverage by his 
independent variable. In my final analyses, I use 325 observations for 77 countries. 




well. Please see table below for the pairwise correlation matrix for all variables included 
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In each of my analyses, the effect of inequality on incarceration rates, the effect of 
world-systems position on incarceration rates, and the impact of modernization on 
incarceration rates, I use fixed-effects (FE) and random effects (RE) regression on my 
panel data. According to Wooldridge (2009), “FE is widely thought to be a more 
convincing tool for estimating ceteris paribus effects” (p. 493). Although FE models are 
not preferred when explanatory variables are constant over time, I address this by 
interacting the time-invariant term with a standardized time variable. Standardizing the 
time variable places the mean at 0 with a standard deviation of 1, which provides the 
impact of the time-invariant terms at the mid-point of the time period. Using RE models 
assumes a lack of correlation between the unobserved effect with “each explanatory 
variable in all time periods” (Wooldridge 2009:489). 
From Wooldridge (2009:503) the formula for FE and RE models is: 
yit = β1xit1 + . . . + βkxitk  + αi + uit, t = 1, . . .,T, 
where the β are the parameters to estimate, αi is the unobserved effect, and uit is the 
idiosyncratic error.  
 For all of my analyses, I use Stata/IC 12.1 for Windows. Stata uses a series of xt 
commands for panel data sets. “Panel datasets have the form xit, where xit is a vector of 
observations for unit i and time t” (Stata 2011:3). The xtregar command in Stata allows 
me to conduct fixed- or random-effects analyses, with an autoregressive process of 
order one (AR(1)) disturbance. An AR(1) disturbance occurs in “time series models 
whose current value depends linearly on its most recent value plus an unpredictable 




 Fixed-effects regressions produce t-values, which test the hypothesis that the 
mean of the variable is zero. Higher t-scores and resultant indicators of significance 
allow us to reject that hypothesis, and are reported as a part of the analysis. Likewise, 
RE regressions produce z-scores, which are also reported in the text of this study. 
Coefficients and standard errors are reported in associated tables. 
 Stata reports three values for R2 for both models: R2 within is the R2 computed 
from the mean-deviated regression; R2 between is equal to {corr (?̅?i?̂?, ?̅?i)}2; and R2 
overall is equal to {corr (xit?̂?, yi)}2 (Stata 2011:493). For all models, I report all three 
values.  
 I run an FE model for the log of incarceration rates for each of my primary 
independent variables and for my control variables. Noting the stability of my chief 
predictor variables, income inequality and country wealth, I use the value of the 
dependent variable contemporaneously (c.f. Killias 1986; Neapolitan 2001).  
Inequality produces a positive and significant coefficient (t = 13.18, p < .001). 
Gross domestic product per capita (logged) also produces a positive and significant 
coefficient (t = 23.01, p < .001). My democracy measure produces a positive, significant 
coefficient (t = 14.45, p < .001). The following control variables produce positive and 
significant coefficients: percent of the population between ages 15 and 64 (t = 25.24, p 
< .001); percent of the population residing in urban areas (t = 25.15, p < .001); 
countries’ respect for physical integrity rights (t = 3.02, p < .01); percentage of the 
population that is male (t = 24.51, p < .001); and the percentage of the population over 
age 15 having completed secondary education (t = 11.22, p < .001). Both the logged 




coefficients (t = 3.16, p < .01; t = 5.45, p < .001). I also examine ethnic 
fractionalization, which I interact with standardized time. The interaction of ethnic 
fractionalization with time provides the effect at the mid-point of the panel, which is 
positive and non-significant (t = 1.05, p = .296) and the standardized time variable 
produces a positive and significant result (t = 4.13, p < .001).  
See Table 7 below for FE results for independent and control variables, except 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































When I examine regions and world-systems position, I use each as referent categories in 
respective analyses. I interact regional variables and world-systems position with 
standardized time, which provides the effect of the variable at the midpoint of the 
analysis. As seen in Table 8, only Latin America produces positive and significant 
coefficients when either the West or Eastern Europe and Central Asia are the referent 
categories. There are no significant coefficients for any of the world-systems positions 
noted in Table 9.  
Table 8. FE Regression for Regional Variables. 
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Table 9. FE Regressions for World-Systems Variables. 









































    
    
I run RE models for the log of incarceration rates for each of my primary 




per capita (logged) both fail to produce a significant coefficient. Democracy produces a 
positive and significant result (z = 3.52, p < .001). The following control variables 
produce positive and significant coefficients: percent of population between the ages of 
15 and 64 (z = 2.07, p <.05), percentage of the population residing in urban areas (z = 
2.97, p < .01), percentage of the population having completed secondary education (z = 
2.68, p < .01). Physical integrity rights, homicide rates (logged), and ethnic 
fractionalization fail to produce significant results. Drug offense rates (logged) produce 
a positive and significant coefficient (z = 4.89, p < .001) and the percentage of the 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































When I examine incarceration rates (logged) for regional and world-systems 
position dummy variables, I find several dummy variables produce significant results in 
other regions. When I use the West as the referent category, EECA produces a positive 
and significant coefficient (z = 2.92, p < .01). In Model 2 below, with EAP as the 
referent category, EECA produces a positive, significant coefficient (z = 3.49, p < .001) 
and LA produces a positive and significant coefficient (z = 2.04, p < .05). With EECA 
as referent category, two regions produce negative, significant results: West (z = -2.92, 
p < .01) and EAP (z = -3.49, p < .001) indicating incarceration rates are less in these 
regions than in EECA.  
Table 11. RE Regression for Regional Variables. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
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 When I examine incarceration rates and the influence of world-systems position, 




CHAPTER 3. EXAMINING TRENDS  
Not only are there differences in many of the variables of interest between countries, 
but there is variation for many of the variables over time. In this section, I explore 
trends over the fourteen-year period from 1994-2008 using Tableau Desktop 
Professional Edition, Version 9.2 for the graphics presentation. Again, I limit the scope 
of this analysis to the 77 countries used for additional analyses.  
To maximize countries available for analysis, I average each of the variables for 
each country for two time periods, from 1994 through 2002 (the median year in the 
analysis) and from 2003 through 2008. The resultant average is recorded for the years 
2002 and 2008, respectively. Due to the requirement for each country to produce at least 
one data point for each of the listed time frames, the total number of countries available 
for investigating trends falls to 49. This includes 18 countries from the West, 7 from 
East Asia and the Pacific, 17 from East Europe and Central Asia, 5 from Latin America, 
3 from the Middle East and North Africa, and 1 from Sub-Saharan Africa. Due to the 
lack of representation for SSA, I omit it from graphic images in this section. Following 
a general discussion of the variables, I explore trends by regions and within regions.  
 An overview of trends for many of the variables for the countries covered in this 
analysis follows. Incarceration rates and inequality appear steady during this time 
frame. The average gross domestic product per capita of the nations included in this 
study reflects growth. Democracy increases from the mid-1990s, coinciding with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Worldwide, the percentage of the population between 
the ages of 15 and 64 has grown. On average, the percent of the population residing in 




half of the period. On the other hand, educational attainment is greater in the second 
half of the period. Homicide rates decline slightly and drug offense rates increase. I 
discuss this more in-depth with accompanying graphical representations. 
Incarceration Rates.  
Incarceration rates differ from country to country. The United States and the Russian 
Federation have recorded the highest incarceration rates for those providing data, while 
India and Indonesia have much lower incarceration rates.  
Looking at the average for incarceration rates across the world during this 
timeframe shows little change.  
 
Figure 15. Average Incarceration Rates Worldwide. 
 
Examining trends in average incarceration rates by regions of the world shows 
the lowest rates in the West, followed by EAP and LA. In the Middle East and North 
Africa, incarceration rates increase more than other regions and are greatest at the end 










Figure 16. Average Incarceration Rates by Region. 
 
Inequality 
Using the Gini score computed as the square root scale of household disposable income 
from Solt (2009), I look at the average for each of the countries included in this study. 
Greater inequality indicates more disposable income in the hands of fewer households. 
For the years covered, inequality ranges from 16.21 in Mauritius to 75.26 in Indonesia. 
 The worldwide average for inequality is virtually unchanged during this period 
with a Gini (net) score of just over 35.  
Figure 17. Inequality Worldwide.  
 
 Examining income inequality across regions, I note the level of inequality is 




inequality occurs in both regions. The West and EECA have the lowest levels of 
inequality. Inequality increases most in the MENA.  
Figure 18. Average Inequality for Regions of the World. 
 
 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
Data for GDPPC are from the World Bank (N.d.a). Coverage for GDPPC is also 
consistent and extensive for the period covered in this study. Worldwide averages for 
the years 1994 through 2008 range from $1,040 (Constant 2011 International $) in 
Tajikistan in 1996 to $64,572 in Norway in 2006.  
Examining the longitudinal data on GDPPC, the worldwide average GDPPC is 
$21,553 during the first half of the observation and increases to $26,141 during the 










Figure 19. GDPPC Worldwide. 
 
 
Regional differences in GDPPC are shown in Figure 20. Wealth in the West 
increases from $37,076 to $43,688. On the other hand, growth in GDPPC in Latin 
America is the weakest, increasing from $12,518 to $12,949. Growth for the remaining 
























Figure 20. GDPPC by Region. 
 
Democracy 
My democracy measure from Freedom House (2014a) combines, averages, and recodes 
political rights and civil liberties indicators. Higher scores indicate more freedom within 
countries. Figure 21 shows average democracy scores for countries from 1990 through 
2012.  
Democracy appears to trend upward, as noted by Clark (2012) and remains 
relatively stable since the mid-2000s. The worldwide average increases from 5.77 to 













Figure 21. Democracy Worldwide. 
 
 Regionally, differences in democracy are fairly marked. The West scores at or 
near seven, the maximum score. Latin America has the next highest democracy scores, 
followed by EECA, EAP, and the MENA, in descending order. Noteworthy is the 
reduction in civil liberties and political rights only in EAP.  
Figure 22. Democracy by Regions. 
 
Age Cohort 
The percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 64 rose from 65.62 percent 
to 66.80 percent. Worldwide a greater percentage of the population is of childbearing, 
marriage, and working age. Increases in the percentage of the population of 
reproductive age also increase strain on available natural and societal resources, which 





Figure 23. Average Percentage of Population between 15 and 64. 
 
 
 Regionally, the West experiences the least growth in the percentage in this age 
group during this time frame, moving from the highest percentage during the first half 
of the period, 66.56, to 66.87, during the second half. All other regions experience 
larger growth in this category, with EECA, LA, and MENA increasing at similar rates 
to one another while EAP increases only slightly.  




The percentage of a country’s population residing in urban areas is represented in 
Figure 25 below. Data from the World Bank’s WDI indicate an increase in the 




average, the world’s population increasingly resides in urban areas. In fact, for the 
countries included in this study the average percent of the world’s population residing 
in urban areas increases from 66.66 to 67.80. 
Figure 25. Percent of Population in Urban Areas. 
 
 Each of the world’s regions experience increases in urban populations. Latin 
America has the highest percentage of its populations living in urban areas, increasing 
from 82.34 to 84.24. Urbanization increases similarly in the West and MENA 
increasing just over one percent. Urbanization in East Asia and the Pacific increases 
approximately three percent, while EECA experienced the slowest growth, increasing 




















Figure 26. Percent of Population in Urban Areas by Region. 
 
Physical Integrity Rights 
Cingranelli and Richards (1999) use an eight-point scale indicating the level at which 
governments respect the physical integrity rights of the populace. Higher scores indicate 
greater governmental respect for the lack of torture, extrajudicial killing, political 
incarceration, and disappearance. There is slight reduction in physical integrity rights 
worldwide. The global average in the first half of the time period is 5.94, which 















Figure 27. Physical Integrity Rights Worldwide Average. 
 
 
 Regional differences in trends in physical integrity rights are shown below. The 
West has the highest average physical integrity rights for the entire period. However, 
reductions in physical integrity rights are noted in the following regions: West, EECA, 
and EAP, while Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa indicate slight 
increases in the variable. It is noteworthy that the measurement for the first half of the 
time period ends in 2002, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. These results may, in 
part, be the trade-off in security concerns for respect for physical integrity rights 
following, and influenced by terrorist attacks around the world. Although the increases 




















My secondary education attainment measure is from Barro and Lee (2013a). I report the 
percentage of the population aged 15 years and older having completed secondary 
education. Worldwide averages in these data range from 4.62 in Papua New Guinea to 
70.69 in Kazakhstan.  
 Educational attainment worldwide increases slightly more than four percentage 
points, from 32.75 percent to 36.80 percent. Although relatively low, it appears that 
from a global perspective, educational attainment grew during the past two decades. See 











Figure 29. Percent of the Population Completing Secondary Education. 
 
 Regional trends for secondary education completion follows. Countries in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia report the highest averages during this reporting 
period. Starting the period with a regional average of 44.61 percent of the population 
over age 15 completing secondary education, the region shows an increase to 49.65 
percent. Educational attainment in the West averages 29.23 for the first half of the 
observation period and increases to 33.35. Although all regions show some growth in 

















The average for homicide rates decreased slightly from the first half of the observation 
period to the second. At the beginning of the period, the average homicide rate for the 
countries covered is 4.27, which decreases to 4.00 at the end of the period.  





 Regionally, homicide rates are greatest in Latin America, increasing from 10.62 
per 100,000 to 14.63. Rates decreased the most in EECA while EAP, the West, and 
MENA all demonstrate smaller reductions. The Middle East and North Africa have the 
lowest homicide rates, with rates in the West only slightly higher. 
Figure 32. Regional Averages for Homicide Rates. 
 
Drug Offense Rates 
Unlike the overall reduction in homicide rates, drug offense rates increase during this 
period. During the first half of the period, average worldwide rates are 146.11 per 









Figure 33. Average Drug Offense Rates. 
 
 Regional differences in drug offense rates are shown below. The West has the 
highest drug offense rates, 301.10 per 100,000 the first half of the reporting period and 
growth between the periods was marginal, only increasing to 316.10 in the second half. 
On the other hand, drug offense rates in Latin America are lowest among the regions for 
both reporting periods, 25.20 to 32.10, respectively. The greatest increase occurs in 
























Figure 34. Drug Offense Rates by Region. 
 
 
 As the preceding graphs depict, the West has the lowest incarceration rates and 
income inequality and has relatively low homicide rates. On the other hand, the West 
has the greatest wealth, democracy, governmental respect for physical integrity rights, 
and drug offense rates; and has a relatively high percentage of the population between 
ages 15 and 64, urbanization, governmental respect for physical integrity rights, percent 
of the population completing secondary education. For the most part, these trends are as 
expected. I note with interest the West has low homicide rates and high drug offense 
rates. Perhaps as serious offense rates, like homicide, are lower, resources are used to 
pursue less serious offenses, like drug offenses. Higher drug offense rates may also be 
associated with greater wealth, with which to purchase illegal substances.  
 Incarceration rates in East Asia and the Pacific are as low as those in the West at 




highest GDPPC, and one of the lowest democracy scores of any of the regions. They 
also report some of the lower homicide rates and drug offense rates.  
Eastern Europe and Central Asia has some of the higher incarceration rates, 
lower inequality, lower wealth, and is mid-range for levels of democracy for the 
regions. Inequality is greatest in Latin America, although incarceration rates are in the 
middle of the regions. Latin America has the least wealth but is the region with the next 
to highest level of democracy. Homicide rates are highest, and drug offense rates are 
lowest in LA. The Middle East and North Africa has the highest incarceration rates, 
moving atop EECA during the last reporting period. Compared to other regions, 
inequality in MENA is in the middle. Regarding wealth, MENA is also in between other 
regions, but is nearer the poorest regions than the wealthier.  
Latin America is in the middle range of regions for incarceration rates, but has 
the highest level of inequality and the lowest level of wealth. The region, on average, is 
second in level of democracy and highest in level of urbanization. Homicide rates are 
greatest in LA and increased during the study period, while drug offense rates were 
lowest. As a region, Latin America has been the beneficiary, and victim, or foreign 
domestic investment from transnational corporations. The presence of FDI tends to 
increase levels of inequality (Rubinson 1976; Mahutga et al. 2011).  
The Middle East and North Africa has the highest level of incarceration rates at 
the end of the period, the lowest level for homicide rates, and has the largest increase in 
drug offense rates over the period. On average, inequality in MENA is in the middle of 





CHAPTER 4. WORLD-SYSTEMS POSITION  
Wallerstein (1976) posits a single capitalistic economic and social system operating in 
the world. Within that system, there is an international division of labor. The world-
systems model is based on a three-tiered structure of economic interactions between 
countries of the world. Core countries sit atop the system with capital-intensive 
production, while peripheral countries have labor-intensive agricultural production. 
Semi-periphery countries exhibit a combination of both capital-intensive and labor-
intensive production and act as an economic and political buffer between the core and 
periphery (Wallerstein 1974; Wallerstein 1976; Chase-Dunn 1998). Exploitation of the 
semi-periphery and periphery by core countries is a central tenet of world-systems 
theory. Core countries have greater wealth, and greater political and military power, 
which leads to increased options in trading with other countries. On the other hand, 
peripheral countries tend to have limited trading options, both in products to trade and 
countries with whom they trade.  
Empirical work establishing the standard for a three-tiered world-systems 
position was conducted by Snyder and Kick (1979). For their classification scheme, 
Snyder and Kick (1979) use “four types of international networks: trade flows, military 
interventions, diplomatic exchanges, and conjoint treaty memberships” (p. 1105). The 
four ten-block models indicate the presence or absence of relationships between 
countries in each of the listed categories. Analyses of the network provide a roughly 
three-tiered model, although Snyder and Kick (1979:1116) acknowledge the presence of 
some countries included in their semiperiphery, considered strong or weak 




countries as perimeter core and perimeter periphery states. Burns et al. (1997) note 
distinctions within the semiperiphery as well, the stronger states of which they refer to 
as the “semicore” (p. 439).  
The impact of capitalism, via unequal exchange, occurs in interactions between 
countries. It also occurs within countries. Changes occur within countries as capitalism 
expands. As noted by Howard, Newman, and Pridemore (2000), “[a]s capitalism 
expands . . . it disrupts indigenous cultures and traditional means of subsistence, 
producing exploitation from the outside and new inequalities within” (p. 152). Also, 
economic growth is accompanied by increased industrialization and urbanization, 
leading to greater competition for resources and greater inequality (Howard et al. 
2000:153). Given the differences in position in the international division of labor, it 
may well be there are differences in social dynamics demonstrated at the various levels 
(Terlouw 1993; Burns et al. 1994).  
Subsequently, dependency theorists postulate income inequality is exacerbated 
in Third World countries, generally those countries in the periphery, by foreign capital 
penetration from transnational corporations, as noted by Crenshaw (1992). In his study, 
Crenshaw uses dependency or world-systems position as one of his explanatory 
variables for inequality. However, he finds little support for position in the world 
economy relative to income inequality (p. 357). He finds support for a curvilinear 
relationship between development and education and inequality, and a curvilinear 
relationship between democratic rights and inequality. Finally, he reports agricultural 




of WSP as produced by Snyder and Kick (1979) for a maximum of 59 countries with 
data from the 1960s and 1970s. 
Clark and Beckfield (2009) confirm and update the three-tiered configuration of 
world-system position for 144 countries using the international trade network, while 
addressing the “age, [and] informal construction” (p. 9) of Snyder and Kick’s (1979) 
model. Their analysis finds the greatest concentration of trade networks among core 
nations, with significantly lower concentrations for both semi-periphery and periphery 
countries (p. 14). Clark (2012) extends the above and provides WSP for 161 countries 
including an expanded core of 47 countries, 38 semiperiphery countries, and 76 
periphery countries for the decade from 1990-2000. Although Clark’s (2012) update 
does not extend into the 2000s, I use Clark’s (2012) updated classification for my 
analyses.  
To investigate the relationship between WSP and explanatory variables, I 
conduct random effects modeling. Random effects regression are preferred over fixed-
effects regression when the explanatory variable is time-invariant. I use the core as my 
referent category in all analyses.  
Results of the regression analysis indicates no relationship between position in 
the world-system and incarceration rates. Core countries have greater wealth, 
democracy, urbanization, percentage of the population ages 15-64, and drug offense 
rates; and lower homicide rates. Semiperiphery and periphery countries have lower 
levels of democracy, lower percentage of the population age 15-64, less urbanization, 




When I examine the relationship between WSP and inequality in Model 2, I note 
inequality is greater in the periphery (z = 2.48, p < .05). This analysis is fairly 
straightforward and does not explore the indirect effects posited by Mahutga et al. 
(2011). This result also reflects the impact of foreign domestic investment and alliances 
formed between ruling classes in core and non-core countries (Rubinson 1976; Mahutga 
et al. 2011).  The semiperiphery produces a positive coefficient that fails to achieve 
significance (z = 1.53). In this analysis, position in the world-system explains 
approximately 8 percent of the difference in inequality between countries. In Figure 35 
below, I show income inequality trends by world-systems position by their averages 
pre- and post-2002, noting the relative stability of inequality in the core, along with a 
slight decrease in income inequality in the periphery, with a similarly slight increase in 
inequality in the semiperiphery.  
 
Figure 35. Inequality by World-Systems Position. 
 
 As expected, and by definition, wealth is significantly lower in the 
semiperiphery (z = -3.91, p < .001) and periphery (z = -7.54, p < .001). The core is made 
up of countries with greater wealth than either the semiperiphery or the periphery. The 




positions. Forty-three percent of the difference in wealth between countries is explained 
by position in the world-system. A graphic depiction of the differences noted is seen in 
Figure 36 below.  
Figure 36. GDPPC by World-Systems Position. 
 
Random effects regression also confirms the relationship between WSP and 
democracy. Democracy is greatest in the core, with both the semiperiphery (z = -2.32, p 
< .05) and periphery (z = -3.02, p < .01) producing negative and significant coefficients 
in Model 3. With the core as the referent category, the results indicate semiperipheral 
countries have fewer civil liberties and political rights than the core, but more so than 
peripheral countries. Position in the world-system explains 11percent of the difference 
in levels of democracy between countries. These results appear similar to Clark’s 
(2012) findings relative to the relationship between world-systems position and 






Figure 37. Democracy by World-Systems Position 
 
 
 Core countries have a larger percentage of their populations between the ages of 
15 and 64. In Model 5, the percentage of the population between ages 15-64 is lower in 
the semiperiphery (z = -2.45, p < .05) and the periphery (z = -5.37, p < .001).  
Figure 38. Percentage of Population between 15-64 by World-Systems Position 
 
 
There are greater percentages of populations residing in urban areas in core 





Figure 39. Urbanization by World-Systems Position.
 
 
In Model 7, the respect for physical integrity rights is not statistically different 
among the three tiers, although coefficients for the semiperiphery and periphery were 
both negative in this analysis. Similarly, the percentage of populations over age 15 
having completed secondary education produces negative coefficients for both the 
semiperiphery and periphery, which fail to achieve statistical significance as seen in 
Model 8. 
Homicide rates (logged) are greater in the semiperiphery (z = 3.97, p < .001) and 
the periphery (z = 4.94, p < .001), than in the core, as seen in Model 9. Again, the 
direction and magnitude of the coefficients is consistent with position in the world-
system. Position in the world-system explains approximately 27percent of the 






Figure 40. Homicide Rates by World-Systems Position. 
 
  
Core countries have higher drug offense rates (logged) than the semiperiphery or 
the periphery. Drug offense rates are greater in the core than in the semiperiphery (z = -
2.03, p < .05) and the periphery (z = -3.72, p < .001), as shown in Model 10. R2 for this 
analysis indicates approximately 15 percent of the variation in drug offense rates 




Figure 41. Drug Offense Rates by World-Systems Position
 
 
 Homicide rates are lower in the core, but drug offense rates are higher in the 
core. Although beyond the focus of this analysis, the differences in levels of homicide 
rates and drug offense rates bring to mind the words of Durkheim regarding differences 
in the definitions of crime and deviance: “Crimes, properly so called, will there be 
unknown, but faults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same 
scandal” (1966:68). In the absence of serious offenses, like homicide, it appears that 
core countries have redefined and criminalized less serious offenses, like drug offenses, 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 5. INEQUALITY AND INCARCERATION 
Inequality has long been a subject of interest to researchers. Kuznets (1955) found 
inequality in the distribution of income within nations increased in developing 
economies as those economies transitioned from agricultural to industrial bases, with 
concomitant increases in urban populations. Inequality increases within countries as 
economies grow but decreases as those economies reach certain levels of growth, 
demonstrating a curvilinear relationship. His investigation of inequality involves only 
three nations, the United States, England, and Germany. From this early research on 
inequality, others have sought to use inequality as an explanatory variable for 
differences in a variety of social outcomes.  
 Quinney (1969) posited that social, political, and economic forces impact the 
social reality of crime. Those in the dominant class impact the definitions of crime and 
impose those definitions on the powerless. Laws are enacted as a way to “control the 
undesirable, the criminal and the ‘nuisance’” (Chambliss 1964:76). Some within 
societies represent a potential threat to the dominant class and may be subject to 
incarceration as a method of social control. As noted by Spitzer (1975a): “Punishment is 
an instrumental mechanism for preserving the structure of social life” (p. 632).    
In prior research some scholars find a positive correlation between inequality 
and incarceration rates (Killias 1986; Wilkins and Pease 1987; Krus and Hoehl 1994; 
Wilkinson and Pickett 2007; Lappi-Seppälä 2008; Van Kesteren 2009; DeMichele 
2010; Lappi-Seppälä 2010; Miller 2011; Healy et al. 2013), while others do not 
(Neapolitan 2001; Jacobs and Kleban 2003; Ruddell 2005). I enhance and expand this 




rates from Walmsley’s ten editions of the World Prison Population List, Gini indices 
from the “Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database 4.0” (SWIID 4.0) by 
Frederick Solt (2009), and others as noted in the data and methods section. The earliest 
incarceration rates from Walmsley are in 1993, and the earliest Gini indices I use are 
from 1990, which allows me to lag my independent variables up to four years. I use 
Stata/IC 12.1 for Windows for each of my analyses. For panel data, Stata allows me to 
run fixed- and random-effects models on the data, with a correction for autocorrelation.  
In my full model there are 248 observations for 65 countries. I conduct all of the 
analyses reported in the following table with that subset of my data to maintain 
consistency in the reported outcomes. When I run the fixed-effect regression 
incarceration rates on inequality in Model 1, it results in a positive and significant 
coefficient (t = 13.18, p < .001). According to the analysis, inequality accounts for 
approximately 49 percent of the variation in incarceration rates within countries.  For 
each unit increase in my inequality measure, there is a percentage increase in 
incarceration rates. However, when I control for GDPPC in Model 2, inequality 
produces a positive coefficient that is no longer significant, yet the model explains 
approximately 75 percent of the variation in incarceration rates with countries. This 
indicates the influence of inequality on incarceration rates is not significant when the 
wealth of countries is held constant. As GDPPC is logged, the resultant coefficient 
indicates percentage increases in GDPPC produce percentage increases in incarceration 
rates. And as countries’ wealth increases, so do their incarceration rates (t = 13.77, p < 
.001). In Model 3, I examine the influence of inequality on incarceration rates, this time 




and significant coefficients, although the coefficient for inequality is less than in the 
first model (t = 6.79, p < .001). The positive and significant results for democracy (t = 
7.24, p < .05) indicate in countries with greater civil liberties and political rights, 
incarceration rates are higher. Noting Jacobs and Kleban’s (2003) findings that 
decentralized federalist democracies tend to subject local officials to greater pressure 
from the electorate for greater incarceration, my finding appears to be in line with their 
conclusions, although my democracy measure does not differentiate types of 
democracies.  
Model 4 controls for the percentage of the population between ages 15-64. 
Inequality produces a negative coefficient, but is no longer significant. The age cohort 
variable produces a positive and significant coefficient (t = 15.73, p < .001). As the 
population between 15 and 64 increases, incarceration rates increase, which may reflect 
the fact that a larger portion of the population is eligible for incarceration. When I 
introduce a control for percent of the population living in urban areas, inequality is 
positive, but not significant (t = 1.19) in Model 5. Urban population also produces a 
positive and significant coefficient (t = 14.90, p < .001), indicating countries with 
greater percentages of their populations residing in urban areas also have higher 
incarceration rates.  
Controlling for countries’ respect for physical integrity rights in Model 6 results 
in a positive and significant coefficient for inequality (t = 13.20, p < .001) and a positive 
and significant coefficient for physical integrity rights (t = 3.29, p < .001). Countries 
exercising respect for physical integrity rights are more apt to use incarceration than 




Although Jacobs and Kleban (2003) note an inverse relationship between 
education and level of punitiveness found by others (p. 728), I find in Model 7 a 
positive and significant relationship between percentage of the population aged 15 years 
and older who have completed secondary education and incarceration (t = 5.80, p < 
.001). Controlling for educational attainment still produces a positive and significant 
coefficient for inequality (t = 8.09, p < .001).  Controlling for homicide rates produces a 
positive and significant coefficient for inequality (t = 12.87, p < .001). However, for 
homicide rates (t = 1.69, p < .10) the coefficient merely approaches significance in 
Model 8.  
In Model 9, I control for the logged variable of drug offense rates. Again, 
income inequality produces a positive, significant result (t = 12.40, p < .001). Drug 
offense rates are also positive and significant (t = 3.71, p < .001). Controlling for 
percent of the population that is male produces a negative, non-significant coefficient 
for inequality (t = -1.25), and a positive, significant coefficient for percent male (t = 
15.16, p < .001) in Model 10. As the percentage of males in the population increases, 
incarceration rates tend to increase. 
I introduce ethnic fractionalization, “the probability that two individuals selected 
at random from a country will be different ethnic groups” (Fearon 2003:208), as a 
control variable with inequality in Model 11. While inequality produces a positive and 
significant coefficient (t = 10.05, p < .001), ethnic fractionalization and its interaction 
with standardized time (t = -.75) does not. In other words, the influence of ethnic 




minimal. Unnever and Cullen (2010) note ethnic intolerance, while not necessarily 
indicated in my variable, was a significant predictor of support for the death penalty.  
In Model 12, I use all of my variables as controls for inequality in the fixed-
effect model. In this model, inequality produces a negative, but non-significant 
coefficient (t = -1.50). Variables producing positive and significant results include: 
percentage of the population between age 15-64 (t = 4.18, p < .001), percent of the 
population residing in urban areas (t = 3.82, p < .001), and drug offense rates (t = 2.67, 
p < .01). Country wealth produces a negative and significant coefficient (t = -4.57, p < 
.001). The variables in Model 12 explain over 86 percent of the variation in 
incarceration rates within countries. Finally, in Model 13 I introduce a regional dummy 
control with West as my referrent category. The results are similar to those listed in 
Model 12, with a slight reduction in the t-score for drug offense rates (t = 1.79, p < .10). 
For the regional variables, none produce significant results. However, the explanatory 
value of the model explains over 88 percent of the variation in incarceration rates. See 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                   























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I also conduct random effects (RE) regression on the panel data. In Model 1, 
income inequality produces a positive coefficient that is not significant. When I control 
for wealth in Model 2, inequality and wealth product positive coefficients, neither of 
which is significant. When I introduce level of democracy as a control in Model 3, 
inequality remains non-significant, while level of democracy produces a positive, 
significant coefficient (z = 3.53, p < .001). I control for the percentage of the population 
between ages 15 and 64 in Model 4. Inequality is not significant and my age cohort is 
positive and significant (z = 4.06, p < .001). The greater the percentage of the 
population between 15 and 64, the higher the incarceration rates.  
 In Model 5, I control inequality with percent of the population residing in urban 
areas. In this model, inequality is non-significant and percent urban is positive and 
significant (z = 3.07, p < .001). The greater the percentage of the population residing in 
urban areas, the higher the rates of incarceration. Controlling for physical integrity 
rights fails to produce a significant coefficient for either variable. In Model 7, 
controlling for the percentage of the population over age 15 completing secondary 
education, produces a positive and significant coefficient for education (z = 2.76, p < 
.01), while inequality is not significant. Inequality is negative and non-significant when 
I control for homicide rates. Homicide rates also produce a negative, non-significant 
coefficient. In Model 8, neither inequality nor ethnic fractionalization produce 
significant coefficients. Model 9 controls for drug offense rates. While inequality 
continues to fail to produce significant results, drug offense rates (logged) produce a 




 I add percentage of the population that is male as a control for inequality in 
Model 10. Inequality is nonsignificant and percent of population that is male produces a 
negative, significant result (z = -4.37, p < .001).  Model 11 examines inequality, 
controlling for ethnic fractionalization. Neither variable produces a significant 
coefficient.  
In Model 12, I include all of the listed controls, save regions. In this model, the 
following variables produce positive and significant coefficients: level of democracy (z 
= 2.51, p < .05), age cohort (z = 2.84, p < .01), percent urban (z = 4.33, p < .001), 
educational attainment (z = 1.97, p < .05), drug offense rates (z = 4.36, p < .001), and 
ethnic fractionalization (z = 2.12, p <.05). Wealth (z = -4.79, p < .001) and percentage 
of the population that are male (z = -2.32, p < .05) produce a negative and significant 
coefficients. According to the analysis, the variables in Model 12 explain over 35 
percent of the variation in incarceration rates within countries.  
In my final model, I include all previously listed explanatory and control 
variables and include regional dummy variables, with West as the referent category. 
When I add the regional dummy variables, my results are similar to those in Model 11. 
Level of democracy (z = 2.40, p <.05), age cohort (z = 2.42, p <.05), percent urban (z = 
4.17, p <.001), and drug offense rates (z = 4.54, p <.001), all produce positive, 
significant coefficients. Country wealth (z = -3.58, p <.001) and percent male (z = -1.94, 
p <.10), both produce negative coefficients.  Using the West as my referent category, all 
regional variables produce positive coefficients, with EECA, MENA, and SSA attaining 
significance. R2 for Model 13 is .41. 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The use of this global model over a 15-year period provides additional insight 
into the influence of inequality on incarceration rates. The fixed-effects model 
demonstrates while inequality is related to incarceration rates in some ways and to some 
degree, as demonstrated by others and confirmed in this study. However, the strength of 
the relationship diminishes when additional factors are taken into consideration. For 
example, inequality no longer produces a significant coefficient when I control for 
countries’ wealth. Controlling for differences in the age demographic and level of 
urbanization also cause inequality to lose significance in the models. In the full model, 
income inequality is not statistically significant. This study provides additional 
information regarding some of the factors within countries that provide significant 
influence on incarceration rates in addition to and perhaps in lieu of inequality. The full 
model explains approximately 88 percent of the variation in incarceration rates within 
countries. The random effects models provide less explanatory power.  
These results support Hypothesis Two, the positive relationship between 
inequality and incarceration rates is confirmed, but only in part. As noted above, the 












CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
Rates of incarceration vary around the world. Researchers have examined the links 
between various societal factors and incarceration rates and have come to different 
conclusions. While some scholars find a positive correlation between inequality and 
incarceration rates, others do not. In this study, I examine the impact of income 
inequality on incarceration rates for 77 countries over the past 15 years and provide 
evidence of factors mitigating the influence of inequality. In this study, I provide 
additional insight using panel data for a broad cross-section of countries from 1994 
through 2008. Using longitudinal data with an autocorrelation correction shows the 
relative influence of each of the principal independent variables under consideration, 
along with the attenuating influences of various control variables.  
 I confirm the positive relationship between inequality and incarceration rates but 
qualify the finding by noting the influence of countries’ wealth, the percentage of 
population ages 15-64,  percent of the population residing in urban areas, and percent 
male on the relationship in fixed-effects models. Although inequality is no longer 
significant, drug offense rates are significant in the full model and approach 
significance when I include regional controls. Countries with higher percentages of their 
populations between the ages of 15 and 64, with greater urbanization, and higher drug 
offense rates tend to have higher incarceration rates. The other significant result in the 
full models is the negative and significant coefficient for country wealth, indicating at 
increased levels of wealth, incarceration rates decrease.  
 When I conduct random effects analysis using similar models for fixed-effects 




While several variables produce significant results in preliminary models, when 
examined in the full model with regional controls country wealth is negative and 
significant, while the level of democracy, the percentage of the population between ages 
15-64, the percentage of the population residing in urban areas, and homicide rates all 
produce positive significant results. Regionally, all regions except East Asia and the 
Pacific and Latin America produce significant positive results, indicating incarceration 
rates are higher in those regions than in the West.   
 Increased inequality is one of the correlates of increased incarceration. Other 
cultural components of societal structure also impact incarceration rates. At the same 
time, the influence of inequality is attenuated by other layers of cultural structure. My 
results support, with qualifications, my hypothesis: increased inequality is associated 
with increased incarceration. These findings also confirm previous findings by Killias 
(1986), Wilkins and Pease (1987), Krus and Hoehl (1994), Wilkinson and Pickett 
(2007), Lappi-Seppälä (2008), Van Kesteren (2009), DeMichele (2010), Lappi-Seppälä 
(2010), Miller (2011), and Healy et al. (2013) that increased inequality is related to 
increased incarceration rates. However, as noted, when I control for country wealth, the 
level of democracy, the percentage of the population of reproductive age, and the 
percentage residing in urban areas the impact of inequality is diminished.  
The relationship between homicide rates and incarceration is mixed. Scholars 
often use homicide rates as a proxy for crime rates, and as correlates of and control 
variables for analyses regarding incarceration rates. In this study, I also use homicide 
rates as a proxy for crime rates. In initial FE analyses, homicide rates produce a positive 




approach significance as a control for inequality. However, in the FE full models 
homicide rates fail to merely approach significance. In RE models, homicide rates fail 
to attain significance in any model. 
 When I evaluate the influence of drug offense rates on incarceration rates, I find 
positive, significant coefficients in virtually all models. As drug offenses increase 
within countries, incarceration rates tend to increase. As noted earlier, drug offenses are 
categorized as mala prohibita offenses, or offenses only because they are deemed to be 
so by society, not because of their inherent wrongness. Drug offense rates are highest in 
the West and the core. Wealthier nations tend to have higher drug offense rates and 
lower homicide rates. When countries experience fewer serious offenses, they may 
reallocate resources to the prosecution of less severe offenses. Considering Durkheim’s 
words regarding “a society of saints” (1966:68), perhaps societies lacking sufficient 
serious offenses opt to turn less severe offenses into punishable crimes.  
 Knowing countries’ positions in the world-system provide little information 
about the differences in incarceration rates between countries. However, I confirm 
inequality is significantly greater in the periphery than in the core, as noted by others 
(Rubinson 1976; Crenshaw 1992; Howard et al. 2000; Mahutga et al. 2011). Core 
countries are wealthier, more urbanized countries with greater levels of democracy, as 
borne out by data used in this study.  
The panel data provide an opportunity to observe trends for some the variables 
in this study. The worldwide average for incarceration rates remains relatively stable 
over the period. Incarceration rates vary from region to region, with little indication of a 




MENA and EECA. Likewise, income inequality has, on average, remained fairly stable, 
generally lower in the West and EECA and higher in Latin America and EAP.  
 Wealth, on average, has increased for the people of the world since the mid-
1990s. Regionally, the West is by far the wealthiest region. The world’s people, on 
average, experience greater political rights and civil liberties at the end of the period. 
The West has the highest level of democracy of the world’s regions.  
Although physical integrity rights fail to provide explanatory value for 
differences in incarceration rates within countries, it seems appropriate to note the 
reduction in governmental respect for these rights in the second half of the period. 
Reductions are specifically noted in the West, EECA, and EAP. Governmental respect 
for physical integrity rights may have been negatively impacted by the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11.  
Limitations 
Variation in the type and quality of data used in cross-national analyses is problematic 
in cross-national studies. Data for this study come from a variety of quality sources. All 
of the data on incarceration rates come from Walmsley’s compilations over the past 20 
years, which provide a measure of consistency. However, as Walmsley notes, there are 
differences in the measures of incarceration provided by countries. Some countries 
count only those convicted and incarcerated. Others include those held in custody 
before conviction and those in administrative detention. Those detained and receiving 
treatment for mental illness or chemical dependency may not be counted among the 




 The inequality indices from SWIID 4.0 provide an extensive up-to-date measure 
computed by Solt. As noted earlier, Solt uses the UN’s World Income Inequality 
Database and uses the Luxembourg Income Study as the standard for his computations. 
Solt notes the issue of missing data as a limitation of his dataset. Countries of Latin 
America, the Caribbean, and of Africa have the largest standard errors in the SWIID 
database due to lack of data for much of the developing world (Solt 2009:10). However, 
he imputes missing data using a logarithmic method that takes into account regional and 
other variations.  
 Although I choose income inequality as the measure indicating the concentration 
of power, I acknowledge the existence and importance of other social inequalities. 
Specifically, I note gender and racial inequalities, which are beyond the scope of this 
study. 
When I use GDPPC as a variable, it provides an average amount of wealth for 
all of the individuals in a country, which may well overstate the wealth held by the poor 
and understate that held by the wealthy.  
 My ethnic fractionalization variable by Fearon (2003) is time-invariant and only 
demonstrates the effect of ethnic fractionalization at the mid-point of the analysis in FE 
models. Ideally, the ethnic fractionalization variable, while varying slowly, would 
reflect ethnic changes experienced due to migration and changing birth rates among 
minorities.  
 I note the presence of historical, political, and cultural differences for countries 




the nuanced variations within countries may be understated, even within those 
variables.   
 Though not exhaustive in the listing of data sources, the above reflects the 
quality and consistency of data used in this study.   
I conduct two types of analyses on the data, fixed- and random-effects modeling. 
Fixed-effects regression is problematic when using time-invariant variables, and when 
interacted with standardized time, shows the effect of the variable only at the mid-point 
of the analysis. Random-effects models examine the influence of time-invariant 
variables without requiring an interaction term.  
Future Research 
 Whether increased wealth is associated with greater incarceration is similar at all 
levels of development is an area for further exploration. Additional research into the 
potential for a curvilinear relationship between wealth and incarceration rates is 
warranted, noting Lappi-Seppälä’s (2010) findings relative to increased incarceration 
rates in poorer countries as GDPPC increased, and lower incarceration rates in wealthier 
countries as GDPPC increased.  
Although this study controls for the impact of ethnic fractionalization, additional 
research on the implications of the growth of ethnic minorities on incarceration rates 
would shed additional light on cultural reactions to changing demographics. The 
examination of changing demographic would provide an opportunity to examine the 
impact of racial inequality on societies. Increasing immigration and the perception of 




Another are of needed study has to do with the use of private prisons. In 
numerous countries, the use of private prisons has increased over the past 20 years 
(Mason 2013). Exploring the relationship between inequality and incarceration rates in 
countries using private prisons could provide additional insight into within differences 
in the use of imprisonment. Growth in prison privatization appears to occur mainly in 
western countries, to date, but increases in the industry and the study of its impact on 
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